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Ralf Rogowski, European University Institute, Florence
Meso-Corporatism and Labour Conflict Resolution
The theory and its application to the analysis of labour 
judiciaries in France, Germany, Great Britain and United States.*
The aim of the paper will be to discuss the concept of meso- 
corporatism in order to analyze institutions of dispute resolution 
for employment conflicts. Collective bargaining and its relation 
to employment conflict resolution is, thereby, conceptualized with 
respect to recent approaches in po li ti ca l.science studies which 
overcome pluralist notions of steady change in intermediation 
processes; instead, cooperation of the industrial partners and the 
state are analyzed in terms of stable corporatist arrangements. 
Starting with a discussion of elements of a definition of meso- 
corporatism, extracted from recent theorizing on corporatism, the 
paper then applies the concept in a comparison of policies of 
employment protection and respective legal institutions, i.e. 
arbitration procedures, industrial tribunals and labour courts.
* Questo lavoro si inquadra in une piu ampia ricerca 
comparatistica in corso presso l'Università di Macerata e 































































































In a formal account, meso-corporatism is characterized by 
tripartite structures which involve regional or sectoral 
professionals of the state and interest associations; meso- 
corporatism can be distinguished from macro-corporatism on 
national level and from micro-corporatism on local level. Recent 
studies on corporatist relations of state and society seem to 
express an increased concern with meso-corporatism.
On the one hand, theoretical discussions of the impact of 
centralized, but also decentralised corporatist policy-making on 
democratic structures try to overcome the prevalence of mere 
descriptions of formal networks between societal and state
institutions. The democratic structure of society and its relation 
with the state are now at the center of corporatist theorizing 
especially in challenging pluralism as the paradigm in political 
science research (cp. Schmitter 1983 and 1984 and Offe 1984). 
Although meant to be descriptive, the new theoretical debates of 
corporatism have a clear normative undercurrent. If "association" 
is put forward as a societal mechanism of integration together 
with community, market and state (Streeck/Schmitter 1984) it 
hardly remains non-normative.
In this context, we still can reconstruct the idea of corporatism 
as an organisational principle of society which expresses 




























































































an abstract system of interacting monads but also to form an 
integrated entirety. Some philosophical accounts of corporatism 
sometimes called it the organic structure of society (Fichte) 
whereas other philosophical analyses stressed the transitional 
character of corporatist arrangements while calling them 'external 
state' within society (on Hegel's concept of corporatism as 
'external state' see Rogowski 1983).
On the other hand, recent theories of the state are redesigning 
relationships of state and society. We find analyses of guidance 
capacities of the modern state with regard to non-hierarchical 
models of relationships of state and independent bargaining 
systems which are characterized by a structure of self-reference 
and which resist direct state intervention (see Willke 1983, p.44- 
47 and 128-144. Willke's concept is closely linked to Luhmann's 
sociology). Empirical studies of those independent corporatist 
arrangements are, subsequently, narrowing their focus from 
national to sectoral, regional or local bargaining including 
networks of the welfare state and associations on this level (see 
for Britain Cawson 1982 ("fragmented state") and Harrison 1984).
To a certain degree, the shift to meso-corporatist studies seems 
also a theoretical response to compelling changes in current 
politics. The abolition of "social contract" policies on national 
levels in major Western countries in the 1980ies creates an 
incentive for the theory of neo-corporatism to look to lower 




























































































talk more of a post-corporatist state (Lewis/Wiles 1984 for the 
British c a s e ).
But corporatism is conceived of as a too narrow concept if it is 
called a model which mainly fits industrial countries at their 
peak (see Roger Benjamin 1980: 68-72). On the one hand, stable 
corporatist arrangements can be observed in pre-industrialized 
societies; in fact, the politico-economic system of feudal 
societies is most often described in terms of corporatist 
relations of the state and guilds (on the use of corporatism in 
historical studies see Nocken 1981). On the other hand, one might 
envisage corporatist structures in post-industrial societies. If 
it is true, as Benjamin views it, that post-industrial societies 
will be shaped by local decentralised governments it might be 
possible to predict organised network structures at this level. 
Because these structures often evolve from existing networks, we 
can already analytically search them in decentralised corporatist 
arrangements; and this creates a further reason to focus study of 
corporatist arrangements on the meso-level of society where the 
future power centers may well be located.
Associations as intermediaries between state and society were 
always -- empirically as well as theoretically -- central objects 
of corporatist studies. But research concentrated until recently 
on the national politics of these associations and their 
participation in national policy-making (especially incomes 




























































































to these studies that processes of corporatist intermediation 
occur not only on national levels where so-called 'peak' 
associations influence policy formulation. Studies on policy 
implementation processes revealed complex network structures 
between state agencies and interest associations on a middle level 
of 'region', industrial sector, single 'state' or 'local 
governments' (see only Bardach 1977; Scharpf et al. 1976) which 
can provide interesting examples for a reconstruction of stable 
meso-corporatist arrangements.
Research on intra-organisational structures of associations, once 
accused of being the 'Achilles Heel' of neo-corporatist studies 
(Teubner 1979: 497), seems presently a rich field (1). Besides 
studies on membership developments and shop floor influence, 
attention was given to the service activities of associations 
(research on legal advice provided by associations is discussed in 
Gawron/Rogowski 1982). But research in this field is still 
occupied by assumptions of different organisational interests of 
leadership and of rank and file which are used to distinguish the 
political function of the association from its service function 
towards their members (for a general account see Olson 1971; see 
also the research design of the project on business interest 
organisations in Streeck/Schmitter 1981). But the more we know 
about the two functions the more we can see that both functions 





























































































The political exchange at the top level, on the one side, can only 
function if leaders can offer internal control of members in 
exchange for political benefits on the legislative level. On the 
other side, exchange processes with the political system do not 
only occur at the top level. The servicing of members is not an 
apolitical intra-associational affair. Middle-level 
representatives of associations participate in administering the 
welfare state, usually as so-called lay members in administrative 
or judicial decision-making procedures. A constant exchange with 
welfare agencies also occurs when officials of the association act 
as representatives of their members in applying for welfare 
benefits and enforcing statutory rights; these exchanges might 
result in network relations between associations and state 
agencies. Sometimes associations can even take over implementation 
of welfare policies; through formal delegation of decision-making 
power to autonomous configurations of interest groups, the state 
might even retreat from control in specific social fields.
Exercise of services for members, therefore, often has to be 
called a political activity of associations. The political 
exchange at the middle level of politics creates continuous 
professional relationships of administrations and associations 
which, ideally, are designed to balance public interests and 
member interests of associations. But it is an empirical question 
wether, in fact, the inner dynamics of meso-corporatist 




























































































interests or wether they serve a new interest of this social 
configuration and its professional and bureaucratic members.
We can relate our definition of meso-corporatism to more general 
discussions; von Beyme's recent definition of corporatism 
summarizes the general debate:
"The tripartite relation of the state and two conflictory mighty 
interest groups suggests to talk about corporatism only when the 
state is not only negotiating with one association which holds 
representational monopoly ... CorporatTsm -- authoritarian as 
well as liberal -- means the attempt to conciliate conflictory 
interests with the support of the state.11 (v . Beyme 1984:224. 
Translation by R . R . )
The tripartite character, the intermediation of state and group 
interests and the conciliatory function of the arrangements are 
the three aspects of corporatism which v.Beyme emphasises. We can 
add an element which Schmitter's well known definition stresses: 
the intra-organisational aspects of control in exchange for a 
representational monopoly of the association (Schmitter 1979: 13). 
Organizational consequences of neo-corporatist cooperation for 
associations are functional specification, professionalization, 
formalization and administrative rationalization (Streeck 1982). 
But for our discussion of a definition of meso-corporatism we have 
to go beyond intra-organisational analyses and switch our 
attention to the increased political activities of associations 
on the middle level of politics. We can follow studies on welfare 
corporatism which analyze corporatist relations within the context 




























































































incorporation which becomes important in this respect (see 
Harrison 1984). Our thesis is therefore: It is constitutive for 
meso-corporatist arrangements that professionals of associations 
take an active part in the functioning of welfare agencies in 
order to maintain service functions for members; through 
participation in welfare corporatism associations gain influence 
in other social fields where direct associational control is 
lacking. In exchange, the welfare state absorbs political 
criticism on its limits through integration of professional 
critics and thereby conciliates antagonistic interests. In meso- 
corporatist arrangements, associations act politically only in the 
formal sense of representation; looking at actual decision-making 
processes with participation of associational representatives, a 
depoliticisation of issues can be observed as the main effect of 
the incorporation of interest groups.
In the following, we will apply the concept of meso-corporatism in 
order to analyze in two ways employment protection. First, there 
will be a discussion of political processes surrounding the 
establishment of labour conflict institutions. Second, we will 
compare organizational structures of labour conlict institutions 




























































































2. Meso-Corporatism and the Establishment of Labour Conflict 
Institutions
Similar to the distinction of macro-, meso- and micro-corporatism 
research on Industrial Relations distinguishes between national, 
regional/sectoral and local collective bargaining (2). The 
importance of each level varies according to country. In Germany, 
for example, the industry-wide bargaining (sectoral or regional 
level) is most important for the determination of wages or hours 
of work (the recent battle over the 35 hour week was carried out 
at this level). By contrast, in the United States most collective 
bargaining is done at company level between local unions and 
management (with some important exceptions in steel industry and 
automobile production).
It seems generally true that centralized bargaining, on the one 
hand, allows to include a wide variety of politically abstract 
issues but, on the other hand, it often expresses a compromise 
with a rather small common denominator. Only baselines are fixed 
through central bargaining and side agreements on enterprise level 
are necessary to regulate details and specific problems (on the 
relation of industry agreements and enterprise agreements see 
Schmidt/Neal 1984: 12-111, p. 42/3).
Employment protection, i.e. especially protection against 
dismissals, does not automatically become a subject of collective 




























































































bargaining because there are no unions or because the bargaining 
partners negotiate exclusively about collective matters; 
employment protection, then, has to be established by the state 
through labour law, sometimes on request of the unions. But 
collective bargaining creates the background against which 
employment policies are carried out. This is not only true for 
national collective bargaining. Also on the micro-level of 
collective bargaining, where negotiations of management and shop 
stewards are institutionalized in grievance procedures, these 
procedures serve as filter institutions for labour courts in those 
countries which have established separate judiciaries for labour 
conflicts.
These official labour conflict institutions, besides arbitration 
at company level, function on a meso-level, i.e. its jurisdiction 
normally covers a certain region. They are created to implement 
employment protection law, in almost all cases with 
institutionalized participation of interest groups. In the 
following, we shall illustrate the operation of meso-corporatist 
arrangements with regard to policies and institutions of daily 
practice of employment conflict resolution in France, West 
Germany, Great Britain and the United States.
The oldest employment protection policy can be found in France. 
Already under the reign of Napoleon Bonaparte the first Conseil de 
P r u d 1hommes (1806) was established on request of the Chambre de




























































































employers. It took until 1848 to create a bipartite bench with an 
equal number of employer and employee members. The bipartite 
structure remains until today and is characteristic of the French 
labour courts. They are public courts with an exclusive membership 
of four lay judges from each side who are presently elected for 
five years (A reduction to three lay judges from each side "est 
prevue" (Javillier 1982: 296)). In 1981, the Socialist government 
created an advisory body, the Conseil superieur de la prud'homie, 
which is located at national level and which has a tripartite 
structure including members from unions, employer associations and 
the Department of Labor (see Javillier 1982: 293).
The coverage of workers by these courts was gradually extended. 
Nowadays only public workers are excluded. Each French labour 
court is still created on special request by a separate government 
decree and
"has its seat in a town of some size and importance, and its 
jurisdiction covers a specified area around that town." (Blanc- 
Jouvain 1971: 17)
Until recently, the French labour court system worked under the 
principle of specific territoriality which meant that only 40 per 
cent out of the population lived within areas covered by conseils 
(Napier 1979: 273). In 1979, the principle of general 
territoriality was enacted which is now supposed to guarantee that 
all French workers, regardless of their place of work, have access 




























































































employment conflicts and not for collective disputes which involve 
trade unions. There exist presently about 270 conseils (Moritz 
1984: 74).
The French unions made several proposals to extend jurisdiction to 
collective issues. After the victory of the Socialist party in 
1981 the unions felt strong enough to ask for direct appointments 
of the judges but so far jurisdiction on collective interests as 
well as direct appointments have not been granted. Already under 
the present system 70 per cent of the worker conseillers are 
affiliated with the unions (Napier 1979: 275).
Those critical of the conseils call them an institution of class 
collaboration which has its function in "banalisation des 
pratiques conflictuelles" (Cam 1981: 209). The allegation is that 
smaller and medium sized employer still ideologically dominate the 
court and the bench; but conflicts of the industrial sector cannot 
be adequately solved in a court which is dominated by values of 
the commercial sector. The old French employer ideal of a 
personally responsible "patron" does not answer the needs of 
functional management or company management by co-determination 
(Cam 1981, chapitre 11).
In general, the French Labour courts can be called a product of 
local corporatist arrangements. The conseils are organisations of 
the town; its locally elected "wise men" are concerned with 




























































































reforms to abolish exclusive local financing and to have the 
national government take over a share of the financial burden. 
French labour courts had some, but only a limited impact on the 
German situation in the 19th century; a general system of labour 
courts developed only at the end of a century when Bismarck's 
authoritarian policy against the Socialdemocratic Party was 
accompanied by the establishment of basic welfare measures.
Labour courts of the present day were introduced in 1926. The 
labour courts replaced earlier "Industrial Courts"
(Gewerbegerichte, established 1890) and "Commercial Courts" 
(Kaufmannsgerichte, established 1904) which had limited
jurisdiction and did not cover agricultural workers. These trade 
courts had a tripartite bench with, like the French conseil, 
elected lay members from the employers' side and the employees' 
side and one professional judge. From the beginning of the Weimar 
Republic, socialist lawyers —  among them Hugo Sinzheimer and Otto 
Kahn-Freund -- were striving for a legal framework of labour 
relations generally known as the "economic constitution"
(Wirtschaftsverfassung) (3). Labour law, among other laws, was
concerned with an infrastructure of legal institutions which 
reached from the shop floor up to the national level thereby 
paralleling the hierarchical structure of the political decision­
making process (see Ramm 1971: 91). One of these new institutions 
of the 1920ies was the Labour Court which was established in 1926 
after intensive political debates (Michel 1982). The labour courts




























































































of 1926 kept a tripartite bench; but its lay members, from then 
on, were not elected but nominated from lists provided by the 
regional offices of the national union and employer federation. 
Labour Courts were empowered to deal with all problems which could 
arise out of the employment relationship; access was guaranteed to 
all types of workers except for civil servants. And labour courts 
had jurisdiction in collective labour law issues i.e participation 
rights of works councils on the shop floor level. Unions and works 
councils could from now on enforce their statutory rights through 
these new labour courts.
In the Third Reich the courts jurisdiction on collective labour 
law issues was immediately abolished but individual labour law 
cases were left to the labour courts so long as they did not fall 
under the jurisdiction of newly established "Courts of Social 
Honour" (soziale Ehrengerichte) which controlled mainly employer 
conduct (see Spohn 1982: 204/5); the "German Labour Front"
(Deutsche Arbeitsfront) replaced trade unions and employer
associations (on the early history of the labour courts in the 
Weimar Republic and during the Nazi period see Wunderlich 1946). 
Labour courts were among the first institutions after the war to 
regain their pre-fascist jurisdictions. They steadily enlarged 
jurisdiction during the 1950ies; in particular the Federal Labour 
Court increased its legal competences by own decision-making 
leading to the allegation that German labour law, especially in 





























































































"sound" statutory law (see only the critical appraisal of Blanke 
et al. 1975, Vol. II, pp. 248/9. Daeubler 1982, Vol. I, p.27 calls 
this tendency "judicial domination" (Richterherrschaft)). Labour 
courts gained further jurisdiction on collective issues by 
amendments to major co-determination laws in the 1970ies 
(Betriebsverfassungsgesetz 1972; Mitbestimmungsgesetz 1976). Since 
the enactment of the "Dismissal Protection Act" 
(Kuendigungsschutzgesetz) of 1951, which continued the tradition 
of a 1926 act protecting white collar workers, there occurred only 
piecemeal reforms in the individual labour law area. The "Labour 
Law Consolidation Act" (Arbeitsrechtsbereinigungsgesetz) of 1969, 
amongst other statutes, led to the clearing up and slight 
extension of coverage and of notice periods in German employment 
protection law.
If we compare the British and the German development we see that 
Britain seems to follow the continental course with a time gap of 
almost 50 years. The first Industrial Tribunals with only limited 
jurisdictions were established by the Industrial Training Act 
1964. But pressure for further regulation of industrial relations 
remained leading to the establishment of the famous investigatory 
Royal Commission, chaired by Lord Donovan. Its Report, released in 
1968, contains a careful description of the state of industrial 





























































































"Britain has two systems of industrial relations. Cne is the 
formal system embodied in the official institutions. The other is 
the informal system created by the actual behaviour of trade 
unions and employers' associations, of managers, shop stewards and 
work er s."(Donovan Report 1968, par. 1007, p.261)
Considering the effective working of the informal system, the 
Donovan Report argued that legislative intervention would cause 
more disruption than order. Nevertheless, it called for changes 
with regard to industrial sectors with no effective regulation by 
collective bargaining. And in "Chapter X", the Report proposed new 
"Labour Tribunals" which would concentrate the various 
jurisdictions on individual employment matters within one legal 
body
"to make available to all employers and employees, for all 
disputes arising from their contracts of employment, a procedure 
which is easily accessible, informal, speedy and inexpensive." 
(Donovan Report 1968, par. 572, p. 156)
This Labour Tribunal would be obliged to seek settlement before 
adjudication; and as much as possible cases would be deferred to 
already existing voluntary procedures. Collective disputes would 
be kept outside the Tribunals and would be left to the collective 
bargaining system.
The political reforms after Donovan were far less cautious than 
the Report suggested. Massive state interventions were first 
proposed by the Labour Government's White Paper "In Place of 
Strife" (1969) and then -- with a different impetus against the 




























































































its Industrial Relations Act (IRA) of 1971. The IRA established a 
tripartite "National Industrial Relations Court" neglecting the 
warnings of the Donovan Report not to overburden labour courts 
with collective labour law issues. Repressive actions of the court 
against strikers clearly increased the already existing hostility 
of the British labour movement against courts and it contributed 
to the final defeat of the IRA in 1974 (See Crouch 1982: 75-79; 
Farmer 1974: 74-82; and on the attitudes of general courts towards 
industrial relations see Wedderburn 1978 and Griffith 1981, ch. 
3). The unions refused to participate in implementing the IRA and, 
subsequently, asked their lay judges to withdraw from the 
tribunals. The experience with the IRA clearly revealed the social 
limits of law as a regulatory instrument in industrial relations 
(See Weekes et al. 1975).
In a general analysis of the development of British labour law, 
H.Collins (1982: 81-83) distinguishes three stages which he also 
calls three "types" of labour law. The first phase is 
characterized by the creation of a "floor of rights" for workers 
against exploitation. Factory Acts and Truck Acts occur in this 
phase. The second phase is called pluralist labour law which is 
concerned with regulations of trade unions and collective 
bargaining in order to protect autonomous regulation of the 
workplace by the industrial partners. This type of labour law was 
favoured in the Donovan Report. In a third phase, Collins then 





























































































"juridicalisation" of labour relations and order in industrial 
relations through state intervention. Unfair dismissal legislation 
is a prime example of corporatist labour law for Collins because 
"it is designed to subject a considerable portion of the realm of 
managerial discretion to judicial control" (Collins 1982: 83). But 
corporatist labour law creates problems for courts and tribunals; 
they are not equipped to intervene in industrial relations and 
therefore are more likely to abstain, follow established 
managerial norms in defining 'fair' dismissals or retreat to 
proceduralism.
Collins view of the rise of corporatist labour law as a means of 
legalizing labour relations seems to be supported by the 
legislative development since the middle of the Seventies. The new 
era of "social contract" policies of the Labour Government 
continued statutory employment protection from 1974 on. The "Trade 
Union and Industrial Relations Act" of 1974, which repealed the 
1971 IRA, kept provisions on unfair dismissal protection almost 
unchanged. The Employment Protection Act of 1975, which introduced 
an obligatory conciliation procedure carried out by the separate 
government agency 'Advisory, conciliation and Arbitration Service 
(ACAS), and the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act of 1978 
which now combines all unfair dismissal provisions stabilized the 
legal foundation of the development of the Industrial Tribunal 
System. And the Conservative Employment Acts of 1980 and 1982 and 




























































































development (see Dickens et al. 1984); few restrictions were put 
on the Industrial Tribunal's, although the main emphasis of 
conservative reforms lies again with symbolic politics in 
collective labour relations and less with employment protection.
If we turn to the United States the picture changes. There have 
been some discussion among American labour lawyers about practices 
of "hire and fire" at "free will" of the employer (see e.g. 
Summers 1976). But in general, the principle of dismissing a 
worker "for good reasons, bad reasons, or no reason at all" is 
still valid. But limitations on managerial prerogatives can be 
established through collective bargaining agreements; although 
presently only 20 per cent out of the American work force is 
unionized the principle of "exclusive representation" of all 
members of the bargaining unit, regardless of being unionized or 
not, has the effect that about 25 to 30 per cent of the American 
workers are covered by collective agreements. 80 per cent of these 
agreements provide that employer may dismiss employees only for a 
"just cause"; disputes falling under this or any other clause of 
the agreement might be handled in formal grievance procedures 
which are established in 95 per cent of all agreements (see St. 
Antoine 1984: 266/7. Also Rogowski 1983: 201-207). Final and 
binding decisions are reached in these procedures through 
arbitration. The state and its judiciary acknowledge the binding 
character of arbitration awards; the Supreme Court decided against 




























































































of the arbitrator which are not covered by the arbitration clause 
of the agreement (see the so-called "Steelworkers Trilogy": 363 
U.S. 564, 574, and 593 (I960)). And the state supports private
arbitration through its Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service 
which provides lists (or panels) with names of arbitrators from 
which the parties can choose their arbitrator. The same service is 
also provided by the private American Arbitration Association. 
Statutory measures for employment protection are rare in the 
United States; since the New Deal of the 1930ies, special 
protection for union members has been guaranteed by the National 
Labor Relations Board ("unfair labor practices"). And in cases of 
discrimination in employment because of race, sex or age the 
government agency Equal Employment Opportunity Commission can be 
mo bi li ze d.
In general, the United States show few corporatist arrangements in 
the employment field outside companies. But through local 
collective bargaining at company level, formal and stable
procedures of collaboration at least in bigger companies are 
installed (usually called grievance procedures) which can provide 
employment protection for some industrial sectors.
We can conclude from our brief historical sketch that it is not 
just short term politics of either Socialist or Conservative 
governments at work when institutions of judicial remedy in 
employment relations are introduced. The dichotomy of




























































































policy on the interventionist side and traditional Industrial
• Relations politics on the abstentionist side (see Wedderburn 
1984), is everywhere decreasing in the employment protection
policy field except for the United States. In general, labour
courts are not designed to act as a substitute for collective
bargaining but rather to extend protection in fields where
collective bargaining does not exist or where it shows 
deficiencies. If state intervention takes the form of
institutionalized meso-corporatism in labour courts, interest 
associations are able to extend influence on regulation of
employment relations even beyond collective bargaining.
In the following we will analyze degrees of meso-corporatism in 
the organizational structure of labour adjudication in our four 
countries. We can use our historical sketches for tentative 
hypotheses: Germany and Britain are likely to have high degrees of 
meso-corporatism; France should be characterized by local
corporatism whereas the United States should show a low degree of 



























































































3. Organizational Structure and Success Rates of the
Industrial Tribunal, of the German Labour Court, of the 
Conseil de prud'hommes, and of the Arbitration hearing
22
Courts are organizations with a bureaucratic structure, personnel 
and a hierarchical decision-making process. We can start our 
comparison with an overview of levels of judicial dispute 
resolution which also are levels of review or appeal.
Chart 1: Levels and organizations of the judicial dispute resolution process of individual labour conflicts
dispute phases Great Britain West Germany
conciliation Advisory, labour court:










Employment Appeal State Labour Court (LAG) 
Tribunal (EAT)





Conseils de Prud'homies: Opportunity 
judgment procedure Commission)
Cour d'appel
second appeal Court of Appeal Federal Labour Court (BAG) Cour de cassation
third appeal House of Lords (Federal Constitutional Court)
Court of Appeal 
Supreme Court
We find separate labour courts on the first level of adjudication 
in Great Britain, West Germany and France. A difference can be 




























































































separate institution (ACAS) in Britain whereas it is the first 
phase of the labour court procedure in France and in Germany. The 
German labour court system is totally independent from the 
ordinary judiciary whereas appeal in the British and the French 
system leads into the ordinary judicial system (in France, first 
appeal goes to the cour d'appel; in Britain, first appeal still 
rests with a labour court (EAT) while second appeal goes to the 
ordinary Court of Appeal). The third "appeal" to the German 
Federal Constitutional Court is put in brackets because it is not 
considered to be a normal appeal but rather considered a right of 
the citizen to be protected against unconstitutional acts i.e. of 
the BAG. This appeal does not prevent enforcement of the BAG 
decisions; the number of cases admitted to be heard by the 
Constiutional Court is comparable to the number of labour law 
cases in the House of L o r d s .
The United States have no labour court system; only to a limited 
degree do private arbitration and quasi-judicial administrative 
agencies perform functions of employment protection. Arbitration 
is usually carried out within the company as the last step in the 
grievance procedure. Review of arbitration awards through normal 
courts is generally excluded.
The oldest American quasi-judicial body performing employment 
protection tasks is the National Labor Relations Board. It is 
characterized by a dual organizational structure: on the one side 




























































































independently investigates the facts in an "unfair labor practice" 
case (e.g. in a case of discharge related to union membership); 
after investigation the General Counsel prosecutes the employer. 
Prosecution leads to a hearing within the National Labor Relations 
Board. This hearing is organized by the second organizational 
section, the Board. The Board consists of the national board and 
and so-called Administrative Law Judges who conduct the hearings. 
Internal review of decisions of these judges lies with the 
Washington Board. Afterwards appeal goes to the Federal District 
Court of Appeal and then to the Supreme C o u r t .
Before we ask specifically about meso-corporatist structures in 
labour conflict institutions we can present available data on 
outcomes and success rates in the Industrial Tribunal, the conseil 
de prud'hommes and the labour court. In all four systems do we 
find workers to be plaintiffs in more than 90 per cent of the




























































































Table 1: Outcomes and Rates of Re-employment of the Industrial Tribunal System, of the German 
Labour Courts and of the conseil de prud'hommes in Unfair Dismissal Cases
Great Britain (1981) Germany (1978)
settlement 31% 60%
withdrawals and abandonments 32% 26%
decision 37% 14%






success of the applicant
in the decision 23% 50%
out of all applications:
actual re-employment 0.3% (IT) 9%
1.3% (ACAS)
(N-36.276) (N-97.164) (N-106.210)
Sources : Department of Employment Gazette (Dec. 1982) p. 520. Falke et al. 1981, Vol.II, p.
974, Uebersicht 4; Rhode 1983, pp. 192/3, Uebersicht 3. Ministère de la Justice (1981) 
Annuaire Statistique de la Justice 1979, p. 75; Moritz 1984, p. 76.
The adjudicatory function of the German labour court judge in 
unfair dismissal cases seems rather limited. Only 14% of the cases 
are contested in a hearing and need a decision (streitiges 
Urteil). 60 per cent are settled in court, either in a separate 
conciliation procedure (Gueteverfahren) or in a judgment 
procedure. The rest are withdrawals or summary judgements i.e. 
judgments in cases where either one or both parties did not appear 




























































































without a full hearing. Judicial procedures rarely grant re­
employment; in a situation where the employment relationship is 
broken, judicial procedures can usually only force the employer to 
pay a higher compensation and thereby increase —  not only 
s y m b o l i c a l l y  —  the cost of dismissal.
The British figures show a higher percentage of cases which get a 
decision (37%). If a case reaches the level of an IT hearing, the 
serious attempts to settle the case by conciliation seem to stop. 
Almost all cases which get a hearing also get a decision.
Looking at rates of success of the applicants in decisions, one 
finds that less than a quarter (23%) of the British applicants are 
successful at a hearing which means only 8.6 per cent of all 
applications are successful in the Industrial Tribunal system.
The rate of success for the applicant in decisions of German 
labour courts is about 50 per cent. If we include compensation 
reached by settlement in court it rises to about 75% (Rhode 1983, 
p.193, Uebersicht 3, Teil 2). It pays to go to court for three 
quarters of the applicants in Germany; in Britain less than 50% 
get any form of redress by invoking the tribunal system (at the 
ACAS stage British applicants seem more successful than in a 
tribunal hearing because they usually gain some payments through 
conciliation).
The French data show a high figure of rendered decisions (53%). 
The obligatory separate conciliation procedure of the conseil




























































































addition, the opportunity to reach settlement in the judgment 
procedure , as it is practice in German labour courts, is not 
widely used although legally possible (see Javillier 1981: 592). 
If we look at individual labour courts we find significantly 
different distributions because of the already mentioned local 
character of each conseil. Cam (1981, tableau 6, p. 124) draws his 
data from only one conseil (Nantes) and he reports even higher 
figures on decisions and lower numbers of withdrawals: 77 per cent 
were decisions, but only 6 per cent were withdrawals and 14 per 
cent were settled in Nantes. Moritz (1984: 75) reports rather 
similar figures to the national figures from another conseil 
(To ul on).
Significantly different are figures for appeal. Germany and France 
show high figures of appeal. In France, appeal goes to the 
ordinary cour d'appel. If we remember the already high number of 
decisions one is tempted to view the high number of appeals (57%) 
as an overall reduced acceptance of the conseils by the parties. 
But Moritz (1984: 76) rejects this interpretation by pointing at 
the divergent structure of the lay court conseil and the legal 
character of the ordinary appeal courts which, in his 
understanding, invites appeals. In Germany, the number of 
decisions are small and cases that get a decision are more often 
about legal conflicts and therefore have a higher inclination for 




























































































In Britain, the low number of appeals might express the fact that 
Industrial Tribunal hearings are already processing labour 
conflicts in a legalized way; in addition, there are filters for 
appeal such as application with the tribunal within a certain time 
period; and appeal is only possible on an error of law not on an 
error of fact. France and Germany allow a trial de novo.
In all three countries the appeal bodies are considered to lean 




























































































4. Meso-Corporatist Arrangements in Labour Conflict Institutions
We shall analyze participation of collective interest groups in 
institutions of employment dispute resolution on three levels:
(1) appointment of professional judges; (2) lay judges; and (3) 
legal representation through associational professionals.
(1) Appointment of Professional Labour Court Judges
Professional labour court judges can be found in Britain and in 
Germany. But only in Germany the appointment procedure is 
characterized by a stable meso-corporatist arrangement. German 
labour court judges are nominated by the Minister of Labour of a 
State (Land) (and not the Minister of Justice as for judges in the 
ordinary judiciary). During the nomination process a tripartite 
committee consisting of an equal number of members from the 
unions, the employer associations and the labour courts have to be 
consulted (par. 18 (1) of the German Labour Court Act). Since
1960, German labour court judges have to be "full" jurists which 
means that they hold the obligatory two law degrees and therefore 
formally qualify as normal members of the German legal profession. 
The selection process by the Ministry of Labour allows young 




























































































industrial relations studies to be successful in the nomination 
procedure.
In Britain judges are called chairmen of the Industrial Tribunals. 
They have to be former barristers or solicitors of at least seven 
years standing, but often they are at the end of their career as 
private lawyers. They are appointed, as all other judges in 
England and Wales, by the Lord Chancellor. Early in 1982 there 
were in post 65 full-time and 105 part-time chairmen (figures of 
the Central Office, Fact Sheet, July 1982, p.l). There is no 
direct influence of interest groups on the appointment of IT- 
chairmen; this fact might be part of the explanation why 
continental observers find that Industrial Tribunal chairmen stick 
to rather traditional and learned views with respect to procedures 
and interactions in the court room (see Blankenburg/Rogowski 
1984) .
Appointment of arbitrators in the United States is done by the 
disputing parties and is usually carried out separately for each 
case (few collective bargaining agreements provide for permanent 
arbitrators). Arbitrators are selected from lists with usually 5 
or 7 names from which the disputing parties alternately strike 
names until one arbitrator is left. A residual meso-corporatist 
arrangement can be seen in the fact that these lists are in 
roughly half of the cases provided by the official Federal
30





























































































Lay judges in Britain and in Germany are nominated in consultation 
with trade unions and employer associations. Lay judges in Germany 
are nominated for four years from lists provided by employer 
associations and unions. In Britain, lay judges are appointed to 
panels usually for three years. From these panels the lay judges 
are appointed separately for each hearing by the Regional Chairman 
of the respective tribunal (Hepple/O'Higgins 1981: 777, p. 365). 
Participation of lay judges in hearings generally tends to be low 
in Germany as well as Britain. The German professional judge who 
studied the case from written documents before the hearing seems 
to have therefore strategic advantage over lay judges who learn 
about the case from the professional judge only shortly before the 
hearing.
British lay members are more or less in the same situation as 
their professional chairmen of having little information about the 
case from documents before the hearing; their influence in the 
back room after the hearing might therefore be regarded higher 
than the influence of German lay judges although little empirical 
evidence of actual influence of lay members on outcomes has been 
produced until now (with the exception of data gathered by Dickens 
1983 on the British case).
In a recent comparison of contributions of French and German lay 




























































































three models of courts with lay participation: (1) expert courts,
(2) lawyer courts, and (3) mixed courts. In expert courts lay 
judges play a dominant role because decision-making follows 
particularistic social norms rather than legal norms. The reversed 
is true for the lawyer courts whereas mixed courts try to keep the 
balance. But neither the French nor the German labour court was 
following either the supposed expert or the mixed model. Moritz 
found that the conseil acts rather more like a committe of general 
representatives than as an expert body and that issues tend to be 
legalized rather than conciliated. And he furthermore found that 
the German labour court was not a balanced body of legal and 
industrial relations expertise. Its activities were dominated by 
the professional judge seeking quick settlement rather than 
intensive conflict resolution (this was also the finding of 
Blankenburg/Schoenholz/Rogowski 1979; 152-7).
(3) Legal Representatives of Associations
In questions of representation of the parties the German labour 
court, the Industrial Tribunal and the conseils de prud'hommes are 
quite liberal. Apart from lawyers, trade union representatives and 
representatives of employer associations and also other 
representatives are allowed in court. And the party can decide not 





























































































Table 2: Distribution of Representatives at Hearings
Industrial Tribunal (1981) Labour Court (1978) Conseil de prud'homies (1970)
applicants respondents
self-represention or 45% 52%
internal representative
legal representative 23% 41%
trade union or
employers!! association 24% 5%
representative






(N-713) (N-697) (N-not known(N-596) (N-443)
Sources : Britain: Dickens et al. 1984: 510, Tabble
Germany: Falke et al. 1981, Vol.II, p.627, Tab. IV/57 and p.647, Tab.IV/66.
France: Can 1981: 125, tableau 8 (except for "femmes, ouvrières" where data are inconsistent)
Slightly higher figures of involvement of associational 
representatives can be found in Germany; but even here they 
participate in less than a third of the cases. Schoenholz (1984) 
found that German labour court cases in which legal 
representatives were involved showed a higher rate of decisions 
than other c a s e s . Cases in which union representatives were 
involved showed the highest rate of conciliation.
Although measures of quality of representation are hard to 
establish in interviews with clients and judges, associational 
representation in Germany is generally regarded as better than 




























































































court cases do not pay well for lawyers in Germany; in addition, 
associational representatives are repeat players who can acquire 
special knowlegde of their court and often are involved in the 
informal networks of these special courts (see Blankenburg/ 
Schoenholz/Rogowski 1979: 157-162).
In our observation of Industrial Tribunal hearings we found trade 
union representatives widely accepting the adversarial style of 
procedure of the ordinary courts. Although procedural law does not 
prescribe the use of an adversary procedure in the tribunals the 
combined expectations of the former barrister-chairman and the 
legal representatives allow little opportunity for informality 
from the parties side and their associational representatives; a 
move towards legalism and 'adversariness' in British Industrial 
Tribunals therefore seems almost unavoidable (see 
Blankenburg/Rogowski 1984).
The relatively high number of self-representation in France (45%) 





























































































Meso-corporatism as a concept of political cooperation of state 
agencies and associations on a middle level of politics was used 
in our analysis of judicial employment conflict resolution in two 
respects: First, we analyzed corporatist cooperation in the 
establishment process of employment protection institutions. 
Second, we compared meso-corporatist arrangements in 
organizational structures of these institutions.
We found different degrees of tripartite cooperation in political 
processes leading to the establishment of institutions of 
employment protection. Apart from industrial relations policies, 
the interests of the state were thereby often shaped by interests 
of the legal profession and the judiciary. In the United States, 
the argument that specialized courts are alien to the American 
judicial system is used to actually prevent courts with meso- 
corporatist arrangements. In France, the bipartite conseils are 
generally treated as creatures of the industrial relations sphere; 
although formally part of the civil judiciary, a hierarchical 
control is guaranteed through judicial review which is widely used 
(more than 50 per cent of the conseil decisions get appeal in the 
ordinary judiciary). In Britain, the compromise was to call the 
labour judiciaries tribunals and not courts. "Real" courts are 
allowed to review tribunal decisions. And in Germany, the legal 




























































































only lawyers could become professional labour court judges. It 
took them until 1960 to be successful.
Nevertheless, it is still remarkable how much influence interest 
groups can exercise in official employment protection even beyond 
their involvement in grievance procedures at company level; and 
this is true for France, Germany as well as Britain. Compared with 
general accounts of (national) corporatisms, the presented results 
on meso-corporatist arrangements are more or less affirming. The 
United States always show low rates of corporatism while Germany 
usually ranks quite high on a corporatism scale (see Schmitter 
1981). Only slightly inconsistent seem our findings for Britain; 
this country generally shows low patterns of corporatism whereas 
the Industrial Tribunals are clearly characterized by a meso- 
corporatist structure.
In a second step, we compared meso-corporatist arrangements within 
labour conflict institutions more concretely. We distinguished 
three levels: appointment of professional judges, lay judges and
represention by associational professionals. The following Chart 2 





























































































Chart 2 : Meso-Corporatist Arrangements in Institutions of Employment Conflict Resolution
Levels Great Britain West Germany France United States
Industri al 
T ribunal






















































Information on grievance procedures are included because they are 
important filter institutions for labour courts which already 
provide the possibility of collective interests to be introduced 
in individual employment conflicts. Probably the furthest going 
filter system exists in France; the obligatory involvement of the 
administrative inspecteur du travail before any dismissal 
establishes a strong preventive system. Especially for Britain it 
has often been stated that a major effect of introducing a 
judiciary for labour conflicts lies with its impact on the 




























































































1983). In this perspective, labour judiciaries are also designed 
to foster collective bargaining.
With respect to our question of meso-corporatist arrangements in 
the organizational structure of labour courts, we can see from our 
chart that Germany has arrangements on all three levels. In 
British Industrial Tribunals we find them only on the level of lay 
judges and associational representatives whereas French conseils 
are characterized by meso-corporatist arrangements on the level of 
representation; the bipartite bench of lay judges in the conseil 
is elected locally; but in cases of impasse in decision-making we 
find a residual tripartite structure in that a professional judge 
may be called in to overcome the deadlock.
We can conclude that collectivce bargaining is related to 
corporatism insofar as processes of collective bargaining 
contribute in establishing and in promoting institutions 
judicial as well as administrative -- in which representatives of 
interest groups participate in everyday decision-making of welfare 
institutions of the state. Institutionalized collective bargaining 
under the surveillance of the state is a pattern which not only 
underlies labour conflict resolution in most Western European 
countries but is taken as characteristic of whole political 
systems which therefore are called neo-corporatist. And it seems a 
major virtue of a concept like meso-corporatism that it is able to 
emphasize the links between cooperation and collective bargaining 






























































































1) Intra-associational problems found special attention in 
Germany; see Streeck 1981; Heinze 1981 and from a legal point 
of view Teubner 1978.
2) Bercusson (1984) distinguishes local bargaining between the 
employer and an individual worker and bargaining of the 
employer and a group/organisation of workers; the latter he 
calls the meso-level of bargaining. This distinction might be 
appropiate for an analysis of wage determination; but for our 
purposes we shall refer to bargaining only as collective 
bargaining and, therefore, we shall call the sectoral or 
regional level our level for meso-corporatism. See also Teubner 
1983: 26/7.
3) As early as 1907, Hugo Sinzheimer, often called the founder of 
German labour law, developed a theory of collective bargaining 
agreements which he called corporate labour norm contract 
(korporativer Arbeitsnormenvertrag). Sinzheimer conceptualized 
collective bargaining as a tripartite process. But the 
inclusion of the state was not central for Sinzheimer's pre- 
World-War-I concept of collective bargaining; rather the fact 
that unions gained protection and recognition from corporatist 




























































































4) It is well known that experts like Hugh Clegg, the industrial 
relations specialist, and especially Otto Kahn-Freund had a 
major impact on the final draft of the moderate Donovan report. 
Otto Kahn-Freund who already took an active part in the labour 
law development of the late Weimar Republic and who had to 
emigrate to England after 1933, was considered the leading 
British labour lawyer in the 1950ies and the 1960ies (See 
Wedderburn 1983 and Clegg 1983). And one has to admit that the 
chapter of the Donovan Report on Labour Tribunals reads like an 
attempt of a former German labour lawyer to adjust the labour 
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